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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HASKELL N. BATES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
JIMMIE SL\IPSON, 
Defenda;nt, 
W. J. SAUNDERS, 
Defendant, Cross-complainant 
and Respondent, 
THE E~IPLOYERS' LIABILITY 
ASS-cRANCE CORPORATION, 
LTD., a corporation, 
Defendant, Cross-complainant 
and Appellant. 
No. 7686 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
CROSS-COMPLAINANT AND APPELLANT, 
THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Bonding Company seeks by this 
appeal to reverse the District Court's refusal to require 
W. J. Saunders to pay the loss suffered by plaintiff 
Bates by reason of Saunders' failure to deliver title to 
the car which Saunders sold to Bates, and the Court's 
refusal to hold Saunders on his agreement to indemnify 
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the defendant Bonding Company, together with other 
error hereinafter pointed out. 
In 1949 Jimmie Simpson and W. J. Saunders com-
menced operating a used car lot at 999 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 151) Arrangements 
for the rental of the lot were made by Simpson with the 
owner of the property, the Utah Motor Parks, for both 
Simpson and Saunders. (R. 151) Simpson and Saunders 
each paid his share of the rent; they shared the tele-
phone, shared the furnishings and the building that was 
moved on to the property. The building was located in 
the center of the lot and the cars were displayed on the 
lot. Across the top of the building was a large sign 
through the center of which ran the words "Used Cars", 
and at one end appeared the name of ''Saunders'' and 
at the other end of the sign appeared the name of 
"Simpson". ( R. 127) Saunders and Simpson had each 
secured a license from the State of Utah as a used car 
dealer, and each had secured and furnished a bond from 
the defendant The Employers' Liability Assurance Cor-
poration, Ltd. 
The plaintiff came to the lot to look at cars on 
November 5, 1949, and met the defendant Jimmie Simp-
son, and after trying out a 194 7 Chevrolet Sedan, signed 
a used car order which appears as Exhibit A. (R. 77) 
This order was never signed by any person as dealer 
or seller. This 1947 Chevrolet sedan had been brought to 
Salt Lake by Simpson under consignment from Brokaw-
Bauer, an automobile company in Los Angeles, Cali-
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fornia. The title was to be forwarded to the Continental 
Bank by Brokaw-Bauer and to be picked up under a 
draft at the bank by Simpson. (Exhibit 11) The car 
had been placed on the lot and had been there for some 
seYeral days prior to the visit by Bates. 
There was no statement made by Simpson to Bates 
as to who owned the automobile, but as stated by Bates, 
Simpson told him that title to the car would be retained 
by the finance company until Bates had paid out the 
purchase price. (R. 110) Bates stated that Simpson 
told him that Bates could drive the car on the California 
license plates which it carried for three weeks, and that 
Simpson would take care of the transfer of the plates 
and the registration of the car. Bates turned in an 
automobile for which he was given credit in the sum 
of $500.00, and on the 5th of November, 1949, he en-
dorsed the title to the automobile turned in to Simpson 
and left the car at the lot. 
At the time of this transaction Simpson told Bates 
that he did not know just where the car would be financed; 
that his partner and finance man Bill Saunders at that 
time was out on a pheasant hunt, and that that matter 
would have to be handled at a later date. (R. 77 -80) 
Upon Bates' return to the lot sometime during the 
following week, he was advised by Simpson that Saun-
ders had financed the deal through Strevell-Paterson 
Finance Company. (R. 84) At the time of the trans-
action on November 5th, Simpson wrote out in longhand 
a copy of Exhibit 1, which carries the same information 
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according to the witness Bates, as contained in Exhibit 
1, other than that the seller was left blank in the copy 
given Bates. Bates claims to have lost that copy; never-
tlieless, Bates signed Exhibit 1 in original and three 
copies, and other than for Bates' signature, Exhibit 1 
was entirely blank and unfilled. (R. 80) 
Upon Saunders' return from the pheasant hunt the 
deal with Bates was presented to Saunders by Simpson 
with the request that Saunders assist Simpson in his 
effort to secure financing through Strevell-Paterson 
Finance Company. At that time Simpson had a credit 
report on Bates and went over the entire transaction 
with Saunders, giving him the information on Bates and 
the transaction as heretofore set forth. Saunders had 
previously known of this car having been brought to 
the lot from California by Simpson, and was aware of 
the car's condition and its worth. Saunders was also 
advised that title to the car was held by Brokaw-Bauer 
in California, and could not be obtained until a draft 
had been paid for the car at Continental Bank. (R. 202} 
The draft from Brokaw-Bauer was not forwarded to 
the Continental Bank until November 25, 1951. (See 
Exhibit 11.) 
Saunders took the four blank title retaining con-
tracts to Strevell-Paterson Finance Company, together 
with the used car order (Exhibit A), and presented 
these documents, together with the credit rating on 
Bates, to Mr. Minson of Strevell-Paterson Finance 
Company. Minson filled in the contract (Exhibit B and 
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Exhibit 1} from the information on the used car order, 
and Saunders signed the purchase agreement as the 
Seller-Dealer. (R. :247) This took place on November 
15, 1949, and a copy of the agreement was shortly there-
after mailed to Bates and he received it sometime be-
tween the 17th and 20th days of November, 1949. 
Thereafter Bates made three payments of $66.00 
each to Strevell-Paterson Company in accordance with 
the provisions of the contract. (Ex. 9) Strevell-Paterson 
Company, on November 15, 1949, gave to Saunders its 
check in the sum of $900.00, the balance owing by Bates. 
Saunders cashed that check and gave to Jimmie Simp-
son his check for $870.10, with the endorsement on the 
check, ''Payment in full for 1947 Chevrolet Sedan, 
:Motor No. N 172835". (Exhibit 7) Simpson then went 
to the Continental Bank to secure the title to the 1947 
Chevrolet and the draft and the title were not then at 
the bank, and he returned and reported this fact to 
Saunders. (R. 214) Saunders then had Simpson execute 
Exhibit 6, being an assignment of the automobile to 
Saunders. 
The testimony shows that Saunders had an avenue 
of credit established at Strevell-Paterson, and by reason 
of that credit was able to do financing with that Com-
pany. Simpson had his credit established with the 
Capitol Finance Company and was able by reason of 
that credit to do his financing through Capitol. How-
ever, Saunders could not deal at Capitol and Simpson 
could not deal at Strevell-Paterson. (R. 157) At the 
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time of this transaction, Simpson advised Saunders that 
Capitol was unable to give him financing because their 
money was out on small loans as it was nearing the 
Christmas season, and he asked Saunders to help him 
by getting the contract financed through Strevell-Pater-
son. Simpson and Saunders agreed that Saunders should 
receive the $70.00 reserve for his part in securing this 
financing. (R. 157) 
Saunders contacted Simpson at several intervals 
between November 15, 1949, and January 7, 1950, and 
during which two-month period Simpson at all times 
indicated he would get the title from the bank. Saunders 
at no time attempted to secure the title himself from 
the bank and at all times indicated he was satisfied to 
rely upon the assurance of Simpson that Simpson would 
get the title. Neither did Saunders at any time attempt 
to register the car at the State Capitol. Bates last saw 
Simpson December 17th at the used car lot, at which 
time Simpson indicated to Bates that he would get 
him the plates to the car in just a few days, and Saun-
ders last saw Simpson January 7, 1950. 
The Brokaw-Bauer people commenced an action in 
the Third District Court in Utah, by which proceeding 
they picked up the 1947 Chevrolet Sedan automobile 
from Bates. 
Saunders and Simpson, during the several months 
that they had been together, had joined in several joint 
ventures, one of them being a trip to Nevada and Cali-
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fornia in which they picked up a number of cars and 
brought them back to Salt Lake City, where they were 
sold and the profits and expenses shared. (R. 202) They 
had on other occasions joined in the financing of ''deals'' 
for each other the same as on the Bates transaction. 
(R. 202) 
Simpson was not served in this case and the Court 
tried the case without Simpson as a party. Judgment 
was given the plaintiff Bates for the value of the car 
he turned in, together with attorney's fees and costs 
in defending the Brokaw-Bauer action for a total judg-
ment of $933.52, and the Court dismissed Bates' action 
against Saunders. The Court gave Saunders judgment 
against the Bonding Company for $867.75 .. The judg-
ment of Saunders was made up of the sums charged 
agairfst his account by Strevell-Paterson in the amount 
aforesaid. However, the District Court refused to take 
into consideration the fact that Saunders had retained 
out of the check to Simpson the sum of $29.90 for which 
credit was never given. The Court dismissed the cross-
complaint of the Bonding Company against Saunders. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
AND eONCLUDE THAT SAUNDERS WAS LIABLE 
TO BATES AS A CO-TORTFEASOR WITH SIMP-
SON. 
(a) The sale to Bates was a joint venture partici-
pated in by Simpson and Saunders. Both Simpson and 
Saunders received bene fits by reason of the transaction. 
(b) Saunders, with all the knowledge of facts in 
Simpson's possession, made the same representations 
to Bates as did Simpson. 
(c) Saunders violated the statutes of the State of 
Utah in the same manner and to the same extent oo did 
Simpson. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
AS A FACT AND CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT SAUNDERS' UNLAWFUL CONDUCT 
PRECLUDED HIM FROM MAINTAINING AN AC-
TION AGAINST HIS CO-TORTFEASOR, SIMPSON. 
(a) Saunders is precluded from maintaining an ac-
tion against Simpson by virtue of Section 57-6-5, Utah 
Code Arunotated, 1943, as amended. 
Cb) The law leaves the wrongdoer where it finds 
him. 
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POINT NO. III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
.AS A FACT AND CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT S~-\.UNDERS WAS BY CONTRACT, 
ACT AND REPRESENTATION PRIMARILY LIA-
BLE FOR ~\NY LOSS SUFFERED BY BATES. 
POINT NO. IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT THERE WAS A CONTRACT BE-
TWEEN BATES AND SIMPSON FOR THE PUR-
CHASE AND SALE OF THE 1947 CHEVROLET IN 
QUESTION. 
(a) The only contract in existence concerning the 
said automobile was between Bates as the buyer and 
Saunders as seller. 
(b) The parol evidence rule prohibits the introduc-
tion of evidence to vary the terms and to substitute 
the parties of written instruments. 
(c) Saunders is estopped to deny that he was the 
seller of the automobile to Bates in view of his express 
representations to Bates and to Strevell-Paterson Fi-
nance Company. 
(d) If there was no joint venture, Simpson was not 
liable to Bates. 
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POINT NO. V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
SIMPSON WAS LIABLE TO SAUNDERS FOR VIO-
LATION OF THE ACT. 
(a) 1~he Court erred in finding that Simpson sold 
Saunders a contract, since Simpson did not have a con-
tract with Bates. 
(b) No statutory liability exists as to the sale of a 
contract as distinguished from the sale of am automobile. 
POINT NO. VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR-
ANCE CORPORATION, LIMITED, CREDIT AS 
AGAINST SAUNDERS FOR $29.90 PAID TO SAUN-
DERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING LI-
CENSE PLATES AND PAYING SALES TAX. 
POINT NO. VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
AND CONCLUDE THAT SAUNDERS IS LIABLE 
TO EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE COR-
PORATION, LTD., FOR ALL AMOUNTS A WARDED 
TO BATES AGAINST SAUNDERS ANDJOR SIMP-
SON IN THIS TRANSACTION ON THE BOND AP-
PLICATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAUNDERS 
AND EMPLOYERS. 
10 
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POINT NO. VIII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAI\E 
FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO THE ALLEGATION 
OF THE COMPLAINT OF BATES AND THE CROSS-
CO~IPLAINT OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY 
ASSURAXCE CORPORATION, LTD., AGAINST 
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-DEFENDANT SAUN-
DERS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
AND CONCLUDE THAT SAUNDERS WAS LIABLE 
TO BATES AS A CO-TORTFEASOR WITH SIMP-
SON. 
(a) The sale to Bates was a joint venture partici-
pated in by Simpson and Saunders. Both Simpson and 
Sa'/1/Ybders received bene fits by reason of the transaction. 
On November 5, 1949, at the used car lot, Simpson 
told Bates that Bill Saunders was his partner ; that they 
would finance the car at one of two finance companies, 
either Strevell-Paterson or Capitol Finance (R. 84). 
On November 7th Simpson again told Bates that Saun-
ders, his partner and finance man, was away hunting 
and the financing would be taken care of when he re-
turned. (R. 83) 
Subsequent to November 7th, but during the week 
following November 5th, Bates contacted Simpson again 
11 
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and he was told by Simpson that his partner Bill Saun-
ders had got the car financed through Strevell-Paterson. 
At Page 85 of the record, Bates states that when he got 
the signed contract showing Saunders as the seller, he 
presumed everything was all right, because Simpson 
had told him before that Bill Saunders had got it 
financed through Strevell-Paterson and he "couldn't 
see anything wrong with it". 
At Page 110 of the record Bates states that no 
mention was made as to who the dealer would be. The 
only discussion was as to the finance company and that 
it would be one of two finance companies, and in answer 
to the question: 
'' Q. Did he say that it might be either himself 
or Saunders that would be the dealer~ 
he replied: 
A. Well, that was later. He didn't say any-
thing about who might be. He told me later 
that Saunders was his partner and he had 
got it through Strevell-Paterson." 
Page 111: 
'' Q. Weren't you concerned at all when you 
bought a car from-thought you had bought 
a car from Simpson and the contract came 
out that you had bought it from Saunders T 
A. Well, the two names was on the place there. 
I couldn't see anything wrong with it." 
In January, 1950, Bates went to Blair Motor Com-
pany to locate Saunders, and when Bates drove up Saun-
12 
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ders walked out to him and said: ''I'll bet you're look-
ing for me'', and in answer to the question : ''You're 
positive that Saunders came up to you and knew who 
you weref'' Bates answered, ''A. Well, it appeared 
that way.'' 
Saunders' own explanation appears on R. 154 as 
follows: 
"Q. Were you on the used car lot at 999 South 
State! 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. On or about November of 19491 . 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Now, when this contract was brought to you, 
was there any signature on the lines 'Seller-
Dealer', 'Title', or 'Dealer's Address' 1 
A. No. 
Q. Now, what was the purpose of you taking 
the position of the seller of this automobile 
to l\Ir. Bates~ 
A. Well, Strevell-Paterson didn't do business 
with Jimmie Simpson. In order for me to 
get it financed I had to sign it. 
Q. In other words, Strevell-Paterson wouldn't 
finance this unless you were the seller 1 
A. That's correct. 
Q. They wouldn't extend credit to Simpson~ 
A. They done no dealings with Simpson. 
Q. Now what then was the purpose of your 
signing on the line, 'Seller-Dealer' other 
than to enable you to go to the Strevell-
13 
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Paterson and represent that you were the 
one that sold the ca:r; to Bates? 
A. Well, in order to cash the contract.'' 
On Page 155 of the transcript: 
"Q. Now what consideration did you get out of 
it' 
A. Well, Strevell-Paterson paid me a reserve 
of $70.00 for bringing them that contract.'' 
On Page 157 of the transcript: 
'' Q. Now it was the $70.00 that brought you into 
this deal ; the chance to pick up $70.00, 
wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He (Simpson) came down and told you he 
couldn't get it financed at Capitol, didn't 
he~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And wanted you to lend your aid in getting 
it financed~ 
A. That's right.'' 
Page 158 of the transcript: 
'' Q. But you were the one that represented that 
you owned the car and you were selling and 
that the title was coming out to you? 
A. I guaranteed it, yes. 
Q. No, but that you had the title as seller? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
14 
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Q. So you were the one that had to get that 
title then, weren't you? 
A. rh uh. 
At Page 195 of the transcript appears the following: 
'' Q. Had Simpson ever helped you out at Capitol 
on a deal like this? 
A. Possibly. 
Q. Definitely he did, didn't he? 
A. Well, I don't know the case, but it's pos-
sible. He bought the car from me and sold 
it." 
As to the transaction between Simpson and Saun-
ders, the story appears on Pages 202 and immediately 
following of the transcript as follows: 
'' Q. What authority did you have to do that? 
(Insert Saunders' name as seller.) 
A. Well, I had his okey on it. _ 
Q. If you had his okey tell me where you got 
that okey and what was said. 
A. Well, he gave it to me. 
Q. Xow, what was said in this conversation be-
tween you and Simpson? 
A. Well, he called me up and I went down and 
he asked me if I would cash it. I looked 
over the credit rating; I knew the car, I 
knew what he was talking about. 
Q. He showed you the contracts, Exhibit 1 and 
Exhibit B, didn't he? 
A. In blank. All he had was pages signed. 
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Q. And so you wanted to know something about 
the deal, didn't you 1 
A. Naturally. 
Q. So you found out at that time some of the 
facts concerning the car, didn't you 1 
A. Oh, who was purchasing it, yes, and the 
amount. 
Q. Now you had already known that the car 
had come from California, from B-rokaw-
Bauer¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. As the result of Simpson's trip to Cali-
fornia¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. The same kind of a trip that you and Simp-
son had been on in July of the same year, 
a trip to buy cars¥ 
A. I went on one trip to California, yes. 
Q. Then you knew that the title of the car was 
with a draft at the Continental Bank¥ 
A. When~ 
Q. When you were talking with Simpson on or 
about the 15th of November~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. He told you all about that~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He showed you, did he show you the orded 
A. Yes. 
Q. Under which the car had been purchased by 
Bates~ 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He told you all of the circumstances con-
cerning the sale and the transfer to Bates f 
A. Yes. 
Q. He told you a little about Bates' back-
ground·? 
A. Well, it was all in writing. I could see it 
and read it for myself. 
Q. You told him the car could be operated on 
California plates~ 
A. He didn't tell me until a few days later. 
Q. You were to see that the title was trans-
ferred up to the State Capitol because you 
were to pay the tax~ 
A. Very true. 
Q. And that was because you had assumed the 
position of seller~ 
A. I don't know about that. 
Q. Did you inquire whether it had been properly 
registered in any way at the State Capitol 
before you placed your name as the seller 
on this contract~ 
A. No. 
Q. Was anything said about who would get 
the reserve ~ 
A. Well, it was understood I would get it if I 
done it for him. Strevell-Paterson certainly 
wouldn't. 
Q. If you did this for Simpson, then you would 
get the reserve? 
A. Strevell-Paterson would pay me. 
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Q. So actually what this deal was, was purely 
an arrangement between you and Simpson 
whereby you would both get a profit out of 
the sale of this car to Bates ¥ 
A. Well, Simpson wouldn't pay me the profit. 
Q. No, each one of you would get your profit 
by selling this car to Bates 1 
A. I would make $70.00 if he had been all right. 
At Page 211 of the transcript: 
"Q. Who gave you the authority to put your 
nanie in as seller 1 
A. Simpson. 
Q. Now what was said about itT 
A. Well, that he couldn't cash the contract with 
his finance company and if I would do it 
he would appreciate it very much. I had no 
reason to distrust Simpson. You don't think 
for a minute I would have passed that money 
over if I had any alarm over the deal. 
Q. Well, you had been in on these deals all the 
way along, you had full confidence in him 1 
A. I trusted Simpson. 
Q. So that once again by entering into this 
contract with Bates, you yourself had made 
the same representation that you would get 
the title so that it could be financed? 
A. I would have if Simpson hadn't defaulted 
on his end of it. 
Q. So that representation is the same to Bates~ 
isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir." 
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At Page ~1~: 
'' Q. Now, :Mr. Saunders, you knew that $870.00 
wouldn't pay the balance on the draft at 
the bank at the time you turned it over to 
Simpson? 
A. Certainly. 
Q. You knew that Simpson had to get some 
more money to pay thatT 
.A. Certainly. 
Q. So you merely relied upon Simpson's credit 
to go up and get the draft from the bank T 
A. Certainly. 
Q. In fact, you were leaving this whole thing 
to Simpson and you were acting merely for 
the purpose of lending your credit? This 
was still Simpson's deal? 
A. That's right." 
At Page 219 of the transcript: 
"Q. But at any rate on January 5,1950, you were 
still having full trust and confidence in 
Simpson? 
A. Well, certainly. 
Q. Had there been anything said or indicated 
by Simpson at any time up until then that 
he was not going to get this title? 
A. I should say not. 
Q. Now if you were to get the license plates 
and arrange for the transfer did you have 
delivered to you an application signed by 
Bates for that transferT 
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A. Yes.'' 
At Page 246 of the transcript Mr. Minson, the car 
finance agent for Strevell-Paterson, in answer to ques-
tions by Saunders' attorney, testified as follows: 
"Q. But, Mr. Minson, if Mr. Saunders brought 
this in with Haskell N. Bates' signature-! 
refer to Exhibit 1-the rest of the document 
blank, and he had with him the document 
which shows as the purchase order which 
goes with the sale and he was willing to sign 
this and signed it in your presence and you 
would loan him money on it, wouldn't you¥ 
A. That's right. 
Q. In fact, that is what has happened in this 
case, isn't it¥ 
A. That is correct.'' 
On Page 247 Mr. Minson states: 
"Q. Did you see Mr. Saunders when he brought 
the document into you. 
A. Yes, I filled out the transaction and issued 
the check. 
Q. Now as to the arrangement between Simp-
son and Saunders, you don't know whether 
they split commissions on deals or not, do 
you¥ 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know wh~her they shared ex-
penses on the lot, do you¥ 
A. Mr. Saunders said they did. Told us they 
did.'' 
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Simpson represented and held out Saunders as his 
partner and finance man, and told Bates that the car 
would be financed by his partner. The two were on the 
same lot ; their names were on a common sign, adver-
tising their business; they shared their expenses; they 
had previously shared on a similar transaction in 
bringing cars from California; they assisted each other 
in their financing, and in the Bates transaction, the deal, 
though still Simpson's, was arranged so as to give 
Saunders at least $70.00 of the profit on the sale and 
financing. The inescapable conclusion must be that 
Saunders acted as and was in fact a partner, or at least 
a joint venturer or actor with Simpson in consummating 
this transaction. 
Saunders knew that neither he nor Simpson had the 
title when he signed the contract to Bates and when he 
sold the contract to Strevell-Paterson. On that date he 
knew that neither the title nor the draft was at the Conti-
nental Banlr. On that date he knew it would be several 
days before that title would be delivered. On that date he 
knew that Simpson, like himself, must secure additional 
money from some source to meet the draft at the bank. 
With equal knowledge of all of the facts he made the same 
representation to Bates that Simpson had made, and in 
addition had made the same representation as to title 
to Strevell-Paterson by inserting his name as seller into 
the contract. The facts are clear that Saunders joined 
with Simpson in a misrepresentation of this transaction 
to both Bates and Strevell-Paterson in order to secure 
the money on the Bates contract, and assumed equally 
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with Simpson the obligation to deliver title to Bates, as 
required by Section 57-6-5, U.C.A., 1943. 
The law is clear that one whose conduct is a sub. 
stantial contribution to the damage or loss suffered is 
liable to the same extent as a joint tortfeasor. The facts 
of this case establish Saunders and Simpson as joint 
tortfeasors, but the law does not require that we need 
go that far in establishing the relationship to hold Saun-
ders for his acts, if such acts constitute a substantial 
contribution to the loss. 
Section 879 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts 
IS as follows : 
"Except as stated in Section 881, each of two 
persons who is independently guilty of tortious 
conduct, which is a substantial factor in causing 
a harm to another, is liable for the entire harm, 
in the absence of a superseding cause." 
''Comment: 
'' (a) A person whose tortious conduct is 
otherwise one of the legal causes of an injurious 
result is not relieved from liability for the entire 
harm by the fact that the tortious act of another 
responsible person contributes to the result. Nor 
are the damages against him diminished. This is 
true where both are simultaneously negligent, and 
also where the act of one either occurs, or takes 
harmful effect after that of another. It is im-
material that as between the two, one of them 
was primarily at fault causing the harm, or that 
the other upon payment of damages, would have 
indemnity against him. It is also immaterial that 
the conduct of one was seriously wrongful, while 
the conduct of the other was merely negligent, or, 
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indeed, blameless. Likewise it is immaterial that 
the liability of one is based upon common-law 
rules, while that of the other is based upon a 
statute." Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 
5, P. 446. 
Section 876 of the Restatement of Law of Torts is 
as follows: 
"For harm resulting to a third person from 
the tortious· conduct of another, a person is liable 
if he * * * 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes 
a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance 
or encouragement to the other so as to conduct 
himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other 
in accomplishing a tortious result and his own 
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a 
breach of duty to the third person.'' 
The comment upon Clause (c) is as follows : 
"Where a person personally participates in 
causing a particular result in accordance with an 
agreement with another, he is responsible for the 
result of the united effort if his act, considered 
by itself, constitutes a breach of duty and is a 
substantial factor in causing the result, irrespec-
tive of his knowledge that his act or the act of 
the other is tortious.'' (emphasis supplied.) 
See Restatement of Torts, Vol. 4, Pages 435, 436, 
439. 
In the case at bar it is undisputed that Saunders' 
conduct was a substantial factor in the accomplishment 
of the sale to Bates. Two factors were necessary to 
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complete that sale. The first was a customer ready, 
willing and able to purchase the 1947 Chevrolet automo-
bile. That customer was produced by Simpson in the 
person of Bates. The second Factor was the obtaining 
of the financing necessary to complete the transaction. 
This f~ctor could not be produced by Simpson and it 
was necessary for Saunders to participate to obtain it. 
Saunders represented to Strevell-Paterson Finance 
Company and to Bates that he, Saunders, was the seller 
of the automobile and the owner of it. There can be no 
doubt, therefore, that the lending of his name as seller 
by Saunders was an essential factor in the accomplish-
ment of the sale. It certainly was a "substantial factor" 
within the meaning of the law as stated by the editors 
of the Restatement. 
We desire that the Court understand our position 
is that there was a joint adventure, a common enter-
prise, participated in and benefited by Simpson and 
Saunders, and that the law of joint venture, therefore, 
is applicable. However, even if it should be determined 
that there was no technical joint venture, under the 
principle stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts 
herein enumerated, Saunders was liable to Bates for his 
actions in participating in the result. His conduct was 
"a substantial factor in causing the result" in any in-
stance, and Judge Van Cott erred in failing to so find. 
(b) Saunders, with all the knowledge of facts in 
Simpson's possession, made the same representations 
to Bates as did Simpson. 
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The Court found that defendant _Simpson (R. 42) 
"falsely and fraudulently, with intent to deceive and 
defraud plaintiff, misrepresented to plaintiff: (1) That 
he had good title to a certain 194 7 Fleetline Chevrolet 
Automobile, motor No. N-172835 CAL with the right to 
sell same to plaintiff; (2) that said defendant would 
obtain registration of title and license plates for said 
automobile for plaintiff; (3) that the finance company 
through which he would finance plaintiff's contract of 
purchase would hold title to said automobile until paid 
for." 
The Court further found that Simpson represented 
to plaintiff that "W. J. Saunders was said Jimmie Simp-
son's finance man and was said Simpson's partner and 
that as said Jimmie Simpson's finance man and part-
ner, W. J. Saunders would finance said automobile with 
Strevell-Paterson Finance Company", and "that the 
only reason said Jimmie Simpson had not obtained 
license plates on said automobile for plaintiff was be-
cause said Jimmie Simpson had been so busy.'' (Find-
ings of Fact X os. 3, 4 and 5 ; R. 42.) 
The Court found that the representations that Simp-
son would obtain registration of title and license plates 
and the finance company through which he would finance 
plaintiff's contract "were false representations of said 
Jimmie Simpson's intentions and plans, said Jimmie 
Simpson did not then intend, and never has intended to 
carry out said representations. (R. 42.) 
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The portion of the Court's finding as to non-exist-
ence of intentions is absolutely unsupported by the evi-
dence. The record is completely devoid of any evidence 
to support a finding that Simpson did not intend to 
comply with the promises when made; in fact, the evi-
dence is to the contrary. Simpson went down to the 
Continental Bank, Central Branch, to pay the amount 
of the draft, when Saunders gave the check on November 
15, 1949, and before the draft had arrived from Los An-
geles. (R. 214) How can it be said that he did not intend 
to pay the draft and pick up the title and obtain regis-
tration of title and plates when he attempted to perform 
these very acts within a day or two after the promises 
were made? 
The intentions of an -actor can only be determined 
by what he says and what he does at the time the inten-
tions were relevant. It is submitted that there was not 
even an attempt by plaintiff to prove the intentions of 
Simpson at the time the contract was entered into and 
the statements made. The only evidence on the subject 
is that he made a trip to the bank to pay the draft and 
pick up the title, as herein stated. 
In the case of Nielson v. Leamington Mines & Ex-
ploration Corp., 87 Utah 69, 48 Pac. (2d) 439, the Court 
expressly held that non-performance of a promise alone 
is not evidence of fraud. The Court said : 
"To predicate a cause of action in fraud upon 
a failure to perform a promise, there must be an 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intention on the part of the promisor at the time 
of making the- promise not to perform it. 
'If the promise is made in good faith when 
the contract is entered into there is no fraud, 
though the promisor subsequently changes his 
mind and fails or refuses to perform.' 12 R. C. 
L. 262; Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P. (2d) 
56. Nonperformance of the promise alone is not 
evidence of fraud. 12 R. C. L. 255." 
The other findings of the Court were that Simpson 
represented that he had title to the automobile; that 
Saunders was Simpson's finance man and partner; that 
Strevell-Paterson would act as finance company, and 
that the only reason Simpson had not picked up the 
plates was because he had been so busy. The latter of 
these is obviously irrelevant and immaterial in this 
matter because it occurred after the purported sale and 
was not in any way an inducement, or intended as an 
inducement, to obtain the sale. Any wrongful act of 
Simpson's was prior to that time. Moreover, there is 
nothing to support the finding that this latter allegation, 
if made, was not true. Certainly there is nothing about 
it that would support an action for fraud or deceit if 
this representation was standing alone. 
Strevell-Paterson did act as the finance company, 
and t4ere is no justification, therefore, for the Court 
finding as it did in Findings Nos. 7 and 8 (R. 32-43) 
that this representation was not true. All the plaintiff's 
evidence and all the evidence in the case shows that 
Strevell-Paterson did act as finance company. Likewise, 
what can be claimed for the representation that Saun. 
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ders was Simpson's finance man and partner~ The fact 
is that Saunders did lend his name in this very trans-
action as seller and dealer. He was the joint venturer 
in the transaction. He did obtain the financing. He 
was Simpson's finance man and partner as far as this 
transaction is concerned. Moreover, the record is d~void 
of evidence that plaintiff relied upon this representa-
tion when he got the contract from Strevell-Paterson 
showing Saunders as the seller; he was satisfied with it. 
Plaintiff was not interested particularly whether he was 
buying this automobile from Saunders or Simpson or 
John Doe, or any other person who may have left the 
automobile on the lot. (R. 85, 86-88, 89) 
What representation did Simpson make to Bates in 
which Saunders did not join and participate~ If the 
representation was that Simpson had good title to the 
Chevrolet, it cannot be said that Bates relied upon it 
because when the contract came showing that the owner 
was Saunders, Bates accepted it and was satisfied with 
it. If the representation was that Saunders had good 
title to the automobile, Saunders made that representa-
tion himself by signing Exhibit 1 as seller. The state-
ments with reference to registration, the finance com-
pany and the obtaining of license plates were made by 
Saunders to the same extent and in the same way they 
were made by Simpson when Saunders signed the pur-
chase contract, Exhibit 1. 
There is no question as to the legal principle that 
even if Saunders had not been liable in his own right 
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and for his own participation in any misrepresentations 
to Bates, he is liable for his ratification of Simpson's 
statements. 
·'Liability in tort may be predicated upon the 
ratification of a wrongful act after it is done, 
where the act benefited, or was done in the interest 
of, the person adopting the same, and was ratified 
with full knowledge of the facts. The liabiilty in 
such case is joint and several.'' 
52 .. A.m. Juris., P. 455, Sec. 115. 
It is apparent that the Trial Judge simply brushed 
over the law of deceit and fraud in an effort to hold the 
Bonding Company liable, without permitting it to re-
cover against the real tortfeasors on its indemnity agree-
ment. In every relevant matter Saunders made the same 
representation, had the same intention, was aware of 
the same facts and was guilty of the same misconduct 
as was Simpson. Failure of the Court so to find is 
clearly reversible error. 
(c) Saunders violated the statutes of the State of 
Utah in the same ma;nner and to the same extent as did 
Simpson. 
The Court found: 
''That the defendant, Jimmie Simpson vio-
lated the laws of the State of Utah in that he 
failed to register said used motor vehicle which 
was brought into the state for the purpose of re-
sale, within ten days; failed to take out a bond 
on such vehicle to protect the purchaser against 
loss of title; failed to obtain a certificate of title 
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from the state tax commission within forty-eight 
hours after sale of said vehicle; failed to transfer 
any title or interest or certificate of registration 
to plaintiff or the company financing such trans-
action as transferee of said motor vehicle; failed 
to give notice of such transfer to the Motor Ve-
hicle Division of the Utah State Tax Commission; 
and sold plaintiff a used motor vehicle to which 
said Jimmie Simpson had no right, title or interest 
in or to." (Finding of Fact No. 12; R. 43-44.) 
It has been heretofore pointed out that Simpson 
and Saunders were joint venturers in the sale of the 
automobile to Bates, and that Saunders was the actual 
seller by virtue of the sales contract (Exhibit 1). He 
was also the dealer, as indica ted in said contract. By 
reason of his being a joint venturer, and being the actual 
seller-dealer, the same obligations devolved on him as 
on Simpson. While Simpson physically drove the auto-
mobile into the state, Saunders was a real party in in-
terest. Certainly insofar as the statute confers any 
rights upon the buyer, the proximate cause to plaintiff 
was as much Saunders' violation of the statute in his 
failure to perform the obligations thereby created as 
Simpson's failure to comply and perform. 
This defendant does not admit that the statute re-
ferred to confers any private right on the plaintiff, or 
that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause 
of any damage to plaintiff. However, Saunders and 
Simpson were guilty of the same violation to the same 
extent and in the same manner. Here again, the Court 
glossed over the rights of the Bonding Company by 
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holding one of the tortfeasors liable and not the other, 
so that the Bonding Company could not protect itself 
upon its indemnity agreement. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
AS A FACT AND CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT SAUNDERS' UNLAWFUL CONDUCT 
PRECLUDED HIM FROM MAINTAINING AN AC-
TIOX AG.A.IXST HIS CO-TORTFEASOR, SIMPSON. 
(a) Saunders is precluded from maintaining an ac-
tion against Simpson by virtue of Section 57-6-5, Utah 
Code .Annotated, 1943, as amended. 
Section 57-6-5 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
provides as follows : 
"Every ~erson, firm, or corporation upon the 
sale and delivery of any used or second-hand 
motor vehicle shall within forty-eight hours there-
of deliver to the vendee, and endorsed'' ( appar-
ently should be "endorse") "according to· law, 
a certificate of title, issued for said vehicle by the 
state tax commission.'' 
Section 57-6-6 provides : 
''No· action or right of action to recover any 
such motor vehicle, or any part of the selling 
price thereof, shall be maintained in the courts 
of this state by any such dealer or vendor, his 
successors or assigns, in any case wherein such 
vendor or dealer shall have failed to comply with 
the terms and provisions of this act, and such 
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him. 
vendor or dealer, upon conviction of the violation 
of any of the provisions of this act shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than $299 or by 
imprisonment for not more than six months in 
the county jail, or both such fine and imprison-
ment.'' 
(b) The law leaves the wrongdoer where it finds 
As heretofore stated, Simpson and Saunders are 
guilty of the same unlawful acts, both as to misrepre-
sentation and violation of the statutory obligations re-
specting sellers of used motor vehicles. In this action 
Saunders is in the position of attempting to recover 
from his conspirator as a result of what Saunders claims 
to be the neglect of the conspirator to carry out his 
part of the unlawful bargain. It is as though one thief 
was attempting to recover from his partner in crime 
one-halY of the ill-gotten gain. 
The principle is fundamental that the law will not 
permit itself to be used to aid a wrongdoer in the per-
petuation of his wrong or to recover against a co-wrong-
doer. The failure of the Trial Court to apply this prin-
ciple to the case at bar was erroneous. Saunders is in 
no position to complain of Simpson by reason of his 
own conduct and his conspiracy with Simpson in the 
very wrong for which he attempts to recover. 
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POINT NO. III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
AS A FACT AND CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT SAUNDERS WAS BY CONTRACT, 
ACT AND REPRESENTATION PRIMARILY LIA-
BLE FOR ANY LOSS SUFFERED BY BATES. 
As pointed out in Point No. I of this brief, the lia-
bility of Simpson was predicated upon two theories. The 
first was a theory of fraud and misrepresentation; the 
second was violation of the Utah statute requiring the 
seller to furnish the buyer with a certificate of title 
within forty-eight hours and requiring the seller to per-
form certain other acts incident to the delivery of title 
and obtaining registration. 
The Trial Judge erroneously found and concluded 
that Saunders had no duty to perform any of the acts 
required by the statute, and that he was guilty of no 
fraud. However, not only was he a co-tortfeasor with 
Simpson, but his own testimony is that as between him-
self and Simpson he was primarily obligated to obtain 
the registration of the automobile and deliver the cer-
tificate of title. Saunders' testimony on this matter is 
in part as follows: (R. 207) 
"Q. Let me ask you one other question, then, 
along that line. You have already told the 
Court that there was an amount that you 
retained to get license plates and to pay 
the sales tax~ 
A. Correct. 
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Q. So you were to see that the license plates 
were secured~ 
A. True. 
Q. Because you kept the money~ 
A. True. 
Q. You were to see that the title was trans-
ferred up to the State Capitol because you 
were to pay the tax~ 
A. Very true. 
Q. And that was because you had assumed the 
position of seller~ 
A. I don't know about that." * * * 
At Page 208: 
'' Q. But Simpson would still be the one to get 
the plates to Bates, wouldn't he~ 
A. No, I would.'' 
Of course, as a matter of law, when Saunders signed 
Exhibit 1 as seller and dealer he assumed the responsi-
bility of seller and dealer, and cannot be heard now to 
say that there was some other arrangement. 
Tlie question of estoppel and contract are treated 
under Point IV of this brief. At this time it is simply 
brought to the Court's attention that Saunders' own 
testimony is to the effect that his understanding with 
Simpson was that he was to assume the responsibility 
of seller. Bates was to look to him for performance 1 
and delivery of title. Obviously the Trial Judge erred 
in failing to find that Saunders was liable to Bates as 
a primary party or at all. 
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POINT NO. IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT THERE WAS A CONTRACT BE-
T\VEEN BATES AND SIMPSON FOR THE PUR-
CHASE AND SALE OF THE 1947 CHEVROLET IN 
QUESTION. 
(a) The only contract in existence concerning the 
said automobile zcas between Bates as the buyer and 
Saunders as seller. 
Bates first came into the used car lot at 999 South 
State Street on November 5, 1949. At that time, after 
looking at several automobiles and trying out the Chev-
rolet in question, he signed the used car order (Exhibit 
A) and the purchase contract (Exhibit 1). He says he 
also signed an application for registration at that time, 
but this document, if it existed, was never introduced 
in evidence. Exhibit A was filled out by Simpson but 
the name of the seller was not filled in. Several copies 
of Exhibit 1 were signed in blank. (R. 77, 79, 80) The 
name of the seller likewise was not filled in on Exhibit 1. 
At that time there was no completed contract for the 
sale of the automobile. The effect of Bates' signature 
on these documents was to make an offer for the purchase 
of the automobile on the terms and for the amount indi-
cated in the document. The offer had not been accepted 
by the seller and there was no contract in existence. 
Simpson did not have a contract with Bates but he only 
had an offer as a used car dealer from Bates to pur-
chase the automobile for the sum indicated therein. 
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Simpson took this offer to Saunders with the re-
quest that Saunders sign as seller, so that the deal could 
be financed through Strevell-Paterson. Saunders agreed 
to this arrangement and took Exhibit 1 to Strevell-Pater-
son Company and there filled in his name as seller and 
his address. He left all but one copy at Strevell. About 
a week later Bates got a copy of Exhibit 1 through the 
mail, with Saunders' name and address filled in as 
seller. (R. 80) The contract, then, was between Saunders 
and Bates, and this was the only contract for the sale 
of the automobile that was in existence. 
Despite these facts, the Court found that Simpson 
sold to Bates the automobile in question. (Findings Nos. 
11 and 12; R. 40) The Court definitely found that Simp-
son was the seller to Bates and that he undertook the 
obligation as seller. 
Bates was not concerned at the time he executed 
Exhibit A and Exhibit 1 as to the identity of the seller. 
When he received Exhibit 1 in the mail, with the name 
of Saunders filled in, he accepted it without question 
and without reservation. In the course of the direct 
examination his counsel asked him: 
"Q. What did you think when this purchase 
agreement was returned to you under the 
signature, W. J. Saunders? 
A. Well, he told me before that Bill Saunders 
had got it financed through Strevell-Pater-
son and I thought everything was okeh. I 
couldn't see anytning wrong with it. 
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Q. What were your understandings of a finance 
company before financing a car? 
A. \Veil, I thought they had to have the title 
and registration before they put the money 
out on it. 
Q. ~\.nd did you think a finance company would 
finance an automobile before it had the title~ 
A. I did not." (R. 85-86) 
• Bates further testified that he thought Simpson 
had authority to sell the car since the car was on the 
lot, and that when he received the papers back from 
Strevell-Paterson Company the seller had furnished 
title and registration to the Company. (R. 88-89) 
On cross-examination Bates detailed the fact that 
Exhibit 1 and Exhibit B, which is a carbon copy of Ex-
hibit A, were signed in blank. None of the information 
was on the sales contract except Bates' signature. Bates 
was asked on cross-examination: 
'' Q. Now what did you ask Mr. Simpson about 
who you were buying the car from~ What 
was said about who would be the dealer~ 
A. It wasn't dealer mentioned there. He men-
tioned the finance company; that they would 
either be one of either finance companies. 
He didn't say who was going to be dealer 
on it. 
Q. Did he say that it might be either himself 
or Saunders that would be the dealer? 
A. Well, that was later. He didn't say anything 
about who might be. He told me later that 
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Saunders was his partner and he had got it 
through Strevell-Paterson. 
Q. And that Saunders would be the one that 
would sign as seller 1 
A. He didn't say anything about it. He told 
me about a week later that Saunders had 
got it through Strevell-Paterson. 
* * * * 
Q. Now then, shortly thereafter you received 
Exhibit B through the mail, is that correct? 
A. Two weeks after I bought the car. 
Q. And did you notice at that time that Saun-
ders was indicated as the one who was selling 
the car to you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when you saw Simpson, on the 17th of 
November, did you say anything to Simpson 
then as to why Saunders was the one who 
was selling you the car f 
A. No, I didn't say anything. I didn't think 
there was nothing wrong with the trans-
action at all. I didn't feel like bringing it 
up. I was wondering about the plates, 
though. 
Q. Weren't you concerned at all when you 
bought a car from-thought you had bought 
a car from Simpson and the contract came 
out that you had bought it from Saunders? 
A. Well, the two names was on the place there. 
I couldn't see anything wrong with it." (R. 
110-111.) 
Bates was content to deal with Simpson as sales-
man. He did not care who the seller of the automobile 
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was. He authorized Simpson to obtain the seller's sig-
nature, to accept the offer which he had made as buyer. 
Even though it be assumed that there was a con-
tract between Bates and Simpson and that Bates thought 
he was going to get the title from Simpson as seller, 
w'hen he received the completed contract in the mail 
and failed to object to Saunders as seller, he accepted 
the alteration and was bound by the terms of the altered 
contract. At no time from the moment he received the 
completed contract in the mail until now has Bates ever 
objected to Saunders being named as the seller of the 
automobile. If there has been an alteration, Bates has 
assented to it. 
In Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 6, Par. 
1896, at Page 5319, it is stated: 
"If the writing is unsealed and the statute of 
frauds inapplicable, an authorized alteration is 
binding upon both parties, and the altered form 
of the contract, not the original form, will be 
enforced.'' 
At Page 5320 of the same paragraph it is stated: 
"Ratification, subsequent to the alteration, 
has as full an effect as authority originally 
granted, and ratification may be shown by any 
conduct fro)ll which assent can fairly be implied. 
It has been well said, 'The rule is just and sup-
ported by the authorities that where a document 
has been altered and notice of such alteration is 
brought to the attention of the parties affected, 
it is their duty to disallow it at once, or within a 
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reasonable time after learning thereof, or they 
are bound by the document as altered.' " 
In Paragraph 1897 in the same volume of Williston, 
at Page 5321 it is stated: 
''A redelivery, therefore, of a sealed instru-
ment by the obligor after it has been altered will 
make it binding in its altered form.'' 
Section 437 of Volume 2 of the Restatement of Law 
on Contracts, is in part as follows: 
"437. EFFECT OF ASSENT TO OR FOR-
GIVENESS OF ALTERATION. 
If a material and fraudulent alteration is 
made by one party to a written contract or mem-
orandum, and the other party, with knowledge of 
the facts, manifests 
(a) assent to the altered terms, the manifes-
tation operates as an acceptance of an 
offer to substitute for the original con-
tract or memorandum an agreement in 
the altered form; 
(b) a willingness to excuse the alteration or 
to remain subject to the duties that would 
exist under the contract if it were un-
altered, the manifestations revives the 
contract in its original form. 
''Comment: 
a. An alteration in a written contract author-
ized by a party thereto before the alteration is 
made cannot be fraudulent as to him. There will 
in effect be assent to the formation of a new con-
trac-t containing all the terms of the earlier one 
except as the agreed alteration changes them.'' 
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In the face of these facts and this authority, how 
could the trial court be justified in failing to find that 
the contract was between Bates and Saunders¥ 
(b) The parol evidence nd e prohibits the introduc-
tion of eridence to vary the terms and to substitute 
the parties to a zcritten instrument. 
As heretofore discussed, Bates received Exhibit 1, 
the purchase agreement, from Strevell-Paterson show-
ing Saunders as the seller-dealer, and as testified by 
Bates, he knew and observed after receipt of Exhibit 1 
from the Finance Company that Saunders was the seller-
dealer. Thereafter he made three of the monthly pay-
ments called for under the agreement. As heretofore 
indicated, he had ratified and accepted the purchase 
agreement which he had signed in blank. 
The plaintiff Bates had never attempted by his 
pleadings or otherwise to set aside the contract with 
Saunders and have it determined null and void, but in 
his action he attempted by his pleadings to hold Saun-
ders on that contract. At the very beginning of Bates' 
testimony, at Page 73, the following questions and 
answers were made : 
'' Q. And did you talk to Jimmie Simpson~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell us what you said and what he said. 
MR. BURTON: We object to this as being 
entirely hearsay as to the Employers Liability 
Corporation. May I ask one or two questions on 
voir dire~'' 
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At Pages 7 4 and 75 Bates testified that Exhibit 1 
was the contract under which he had made three pay-
ments to Strevell-Paterson. At Page 75 the following 
objection was then made : 
"MR. BURTON: And we make the motion 
then, further at this time, that any statements 
made between Simpson or any conversation had 
with Simpson and this witness are hearsay and 
an attempt to vary the terms of a written contract 
and all of the terms of the contract are found in 
this Exhibit 1." 
On Page 76, after overruling the objection, the fol-
lowing discussion took place : 
"MR. BURTON: Could our objection be 
understood as running to all of the conversation 
with Simpson' 
THE COURT: Yes, it may." 
Exhibit 1 contains the provision: "This agreement 
constitutes the entire contract between the parties.'' It 
is submitted, therefore, that as to the surety, Bates, by 
his actions in signing Exhibit 1 in blank, by thereafter 
accepting it, and thereafter by this action seeking to 
enforce that contract against Saunders, is precluded 
from attempting to vary the terms of that contract by 
parol, and the Court erred in admitting parol evidence 
to vary Exhibit 1. Especially is this true where, as here-
tofore pointed out, there was no fraud shown, nor was 
there any imposition upon Bates in the matter of filling 
in the blanks or securing the signature of Saunders. No 
such fraud is alleged or claimed by plaintiff. There is 
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no attempt on his part to show a contract for the pur-
chase of the car other than as contained in Exhibit 1. 
(c) Saunders is estopped to deny that he was the 
seller of the automobile to Bates in view of his express 
representations to Bates and to Strevell-Paterson Fi-
nance Company. 
As heretofore· pointed out, Saunders stated to Stre-
vell-Paterson and to Bates by signing the purchase agree-
ment that he was the seller of the automobile. Bates 
relied on the statement in making payments to Strevell. 
He further relied upon it in leaving the Ford which he 
traded in on the Chevrolet at the used car lot, and in 
treating the transaction as being completed. Bates be-
lieved Saunders was the seller. Strevell-Paterson relied 
on the representations in advancing the money to Simp-
son and in financing the transaction. All of the elements 
of estoppel are present. Saunders is in no position to 
refuse to respond to the obligation imposed by law 
upon him as seller. 
POINT NO. V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
SIMPSON WAS LIABLE TO SAUNDERS FOR VIO-
LATION OF THE ACT. 
(a) The Court erred in finding that Simpson sold 
Saunders a contract, since Simpson did not have a con-
tract with Bates. 
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This question has been discussed under Point No. 
IV, particularly subdivision (a) thereof, and no purpose 
will be served by restating the argument therein set out. 
The Court found in the second set of findings pre-
sented by counsel for Saunders (Finding No. 4, R. 50) 
that Simpson sold a purchase agreement to Saunders. 
This is a fallacious theory, since in the first place Simp-
son did not have a contract with Bates to sell to any-
body. All he had was an offer. In the second place, the 
sale of a contract, as much as the sale of any other valu-
able right or thing, is itself a contract and must be sup-
ported by consideration. Simpson paid no consideration 
to Saunders or Saunders to Simpson. Each was to bene-
fit from the transaction, but Saunders was to be remun-
erated by Strevell-Paterson, while Simpson was to be 
paid by Bates. There was no transaction-certainly no 
misrepresentation-as such between Saunders and Simp-
son on which Simpson can be liable to Saunders. 
(b) No statutory liability exists as to the sale of a 
contract as distinguished from the sale of a;n automobile. 
The Court predicates liability by Simpson to Saun-
ders upon the statute which requires persons who bring 
automobiles into the State of Utah for the purpose of 
transferring title to register such automobiles within a 
prescribed period of time. (Finding of Fact No. 12; 
R. 52; Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. 53) As heretofore 
pointed out, the appellant does not admit that this statute 
confers a private right upon any person, but if it does, 
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certainly the right can only be conferred upon the per-
son who purchases an automobile. Neither did Saunders 
contend nor did the Trial Court find that Simpson sold 
Saunders an automobile. Just the reverse is true. Saun-
ders contended and the Trial Court found that Simpson 
did not sell Saunders an automobile, but that Saunders 
purchased the contract. Saunders expressly denied in 
the record that he bought the car from Simpson. At 
Page 194 it is stated: 
"Q. And that is what you did-you bought a car 
from 'eimpson as a matter of helping him 
get credit through Strevell-Paterson on fi-
nancing! 
A. No sir, no sir." 
If Saunders' theory was that Simpson assigned to 
him a valuable right which he had to require Bates to 
purchase the car and obtain the title from the Conti-
nental Bank by paying the draft, Saunders could not 
possibly recover, because as to this possibility there was 
no breach of any obligation, no misrepresentation, and 
no violation of any statute. Certainly the Court erred 
in stretching the statute to hold Simpson and the Bond-
ing Company liable to Saunders for an imagined vio-
lation. 
POINT NO. VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR-
ANCE CORPORATION, LIMITED, CREDIT AS 
AGAINST SAUNDERS' FOR $29.90 PAID TO SAUN-
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DERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING LI-
CENSE PLATES AND PAYING SALES TAX. 
The Court gave judgment to Saunders against 
Simpson in the amount of $867.75. This was the sum 
that Strevell-Paterson Finance Company debited Saun-
ders' account when the automobile was repossessed by 
Brokaw-Bauer and Bates defaulted on his contract, after 
deducting Saunders' reserve from the transaction. Saun-
ders admitted, however, that he kept out the amount 
which he turned over to Simpson $29.90 for the purpose 
of obtaining registration of the automobile in Utah and 
paying the sales tax. (R. 207) No credit was given by 
the Court for this sum. Even if Simpson was liable to 
Saunders, the amount of the judgment should be re-
duced in this amount. 
POINT NO. VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
AND CONCLUDE THAT SAUNDERS IS LIABLE 
TO EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE COR-
PORATION, LTD., FOR ALL AMOUNTS A WARDED 
TO BATES AGAINST SAUNDERS ANDjOR SIMP-
SON IN THIS TRANSACTION ON THE BOND AP-
PLICATION AGREENIENT BETWEEN SAUNDERS 
AND EMPLOYERS. 
There was introduced as Exhibit B by Employers 
the application for surety bond executed by defendant 
Saunders to the Employers Company. As a part of the 
application, Saunders agreed: 
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''Second, to indemnify the said company 
against all loss, liability, costs, damages, attor-
ney~' fees and expenses whatever, which the com-
pany may sustain or incur by reason of executing 
said bond, in making any investigation on account 
thereof, in prosecuting or defending any action 
which may be brought in connection therewith, in 
obtaining a release therefrom, and in enforcing 
any of the agreements herein contained.'' 
It is clear that Saunders was liable to Bates, and 
the liability therefore accrued against Employers Com-
pany. Both as a joint venturer, therefore, and in his 
own right as seller to Bates, Saunders is liable to Em-
ployers on this bond application. The Trial Judge 
clearly erred in failing to grant judgment in favor of 
Employers and against Saunders, and in failing to re-
quire Saunders to hold Employers liable for the amount 
of the judgment. 
In fact, the Trial Judge's theory seemed to be that 
he had a bonding company before him, and that he would 
work out some holding that would permit the plaintiff 
to recover against the bonding company and permit 
recovery against the bonding company by Saunders, 
regardless of the legal considerations involved. The 
liability of Saunders to the bonding company in the 
event of judgment against him accounts for the unusual 
effort to free Saunders from liability. 
It is submitted that the failure of the Court to grant 
judgment to Employers Company and against Saunders 
is plain and reversible error. 
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POINT NO. VIII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO l\fAKE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO THE ALLEGA1,ION 
OF THE COMPLAINT OF BATES AND THE CROSS-
COMPLAINT OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY 
ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD., AGAINST 
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-DEFENDANT SAUN-
DERS. 
Plaintiff's amended complaint states in substance 
that Saunders falsely and fraudulently represented to 
plaintiff and to Strevell-Paterson Finance Company that 
the title was held by Saunders and Strevell-Paterson, 
and that every representation made by Simpson to 
plaintiff was true; that plaintiff believed said repre-
sentations and relied thereon, and that he was thereby 
damaged. (Par. 10 of said Amended Complaint; R. 14) 
Plaintiff further alleged that Saunders violated the laws 
of the State of Utah in failing to register the vehicle in 
question, failing to obtain a certificate of title trans-
ferring same to plaintiff, and that Saunders was further 
liable in adopting the contract prepared by Simpson. 
(Pars. 14, 15 and 16 of said Amended Complaint; R. 15) 
The Employers' Company alleged in its cross-com-
plaint against Saunders that the sale of the automobile 
by Simpson and Saunders was in pursuit of the business 
of these persons as a joint enterprise; that Saunders 
was aware of all of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the sale, and that he was liable as a principal 
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to Bates and therefore liable to Employers on his in-
demnity agreement. (Pars. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 ; R. 29) Em-
ployers further alleged that Saunders sold the car to 
Bates and that he did not have title and knew he did 
not, and that he was primarily liable by reason of the 
subsequent obligations placed on the seller of the auto-
mobile. (Pars. 3 and 4, R. 30.) 
At no point in the two sets of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel for Bates and 
Saunders did the Court make findings on these ques-
tions. Counsel for plaintiff apparently felt that he 
should make an effort, so he included the finding, "that 
the allegations in plaintiff's complaint against defendant 
W. J. Saunders except as stated in these findings, are 
not sustained by the evidence and are untrue.'' No 
further effort was made to explain away Saunders' 
liability to Bates. 
This Court has held in decisions too numerous to 
require citation that litigants are entitled to findings 
upon all questions of fact raised by their pleadings. 
The questions raised as to the knowledge of Saunders, 
his signing the purchase document as seller, his partici-
pation in the transaction, and his remuneration from 
Strevell, together with questions concerning adoption 
and ratification by him, are all seriously raised by plain-
tiff and by this appellant. The fact is that there is no 
evidence in the record and none available except that 
the contentions made as to Saunders' liability are true. 
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No facts could be found except that which would require 
a conclusion that Saunders was liable. 
Certainly the Trial Court erred in failing to make 
findings on these important issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The errors of the Trial Court require a new trial. 
Judgment sholild in any event be entered in favor of 
Employer against Simpson on its indemnity agreement. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN 
and RICHARDS 
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